The Present-Day Populations of Asia Minor
Ioannis K. Neonakis
Head of the Romeosyne Policy Department, NIKI
Democratic Patriotic Popular Movement NIKI
ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ: Περὶ ἐξισλαμισμοῦ καὶ ἐκτουρκισμοῦ τοῦ Γένους μας – Οἱ σημερινοί Μικρασιατικοί πληθυσμοί
Whoever strolls today through the old city of Constantinople, in the
district of Laleli, may find himself standing before a small and
seemingly humble mosque—the Bodrum Mosque, also known as the Mesih Paşa
Mosque. At first glance it resembles far more a Romeike (Rum) church
than an Ottoman place of worship. And this is not accidental; beneath
its later renovations lies the ancient Monastery of Myrelaion, a women’s
monastery founded by Emperor Romanos Lekapenos, the burial place of
himself and his family.
Even more striking, however, is the figure of the very man whose name
the monument now bears: the Grand Vizier Mesih Paşa. A distinguished
descendant of the imperial Palaiologos family, son of Manuel
Palaiologos, Despot of Thessaloniki, a Romeos who was Islamized and who
rose to become admiral of the Ottoman fleet and Grand Vizier—he who laid
siege to Rhodes, turning in essence against his own people.
The presence of a “Palaiologos” at the summit of the Ottoman hierarchy
is not a curious historical exception. It is a window into a chapter of
our history that we usually silence: the chapter of the Islamization
and, subsequently, the Turkification of a great part of the Genos of the
Romeoi.
1. Who, then, are the “Turks?
The bitter truth behind the question
In our historical imagination a simplistic narrative prevails: that a
tribe of Mongol nomad horsemen—fewer than a few tens of thousands—poured
forth from Central Asia, defeated the forces guarding the eastern
borders of our homeland, Romanía, and penetrated into the interior
burning, plundering, multiplying, and—somehow magically—establishing an
empire that would last for centuries.
But such narratives cannot stand to reason. It is impossible for a small
nomadic group to overthrow a thousand-year-old world power, to organize
a complex administration, a sophisticated bureaucracy, effective
military structures, and a famed diplomacy of long-term strategic
vision, unless it stands upon pre-existing populations, institutions,
and capacities.
At the time these nomads entered Anatolia, there were already several
millions—more than ten million by some estimates—of indigenous
inhabitants, predominantly Greek-speaking Romeoi. These were the people
who cultivated the land, lived along the coasts and inland, who filled
the cities, monasteries, and parishes of Asia Minor. What became of
them? Were they slaughtered? Did they disappear? Were they vaporized?
Were they only the one and a half million Greeks exchanged after 1922?
Or did something else occur?
And there is something everyone sees yet subconsciously refuses to
acknowledge: we watch their television series and visit Turkey as
tourists, yet we do not see Mongols anywhere. Perhaps rarely one might
be encountered—but even he is most likely a recent immigrant from a
Central Asian country friendly to Turkey. Then if the Turks are not
Mongols or Central Asians in the way we imagine, what are they? Could it
be that the historical truth is that the indigenous populations first
became Islamized and only later Turkified, forming the principal body of
what is today called the “Turkish nation”?
The position that—except for the Kurds, who are a historical people—the
great majority of the present-day “Turks” of Anatolia are indigenous
Asia Minor and Balkan populations, that is, Islamized Romeoi and other
Christians, has now been amply documented. Many books have been written
on this subject; indicative are three:
(a) The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization (11th–15th Century) by Speros Vryonis,
(b) Which Turkey? Which Turks? by Frangoulis Frangos, and
(c) Who Are the Turks? by Nikos Cheiladakis.
Islamization and Turkification were not momentary episodes; they were
complex processes lasting more than ten centuries and continuing in
altered forms even today (e.g., in Western Thrace, the Balkans, and the
international networks of Islamic orders).
2. Why did the peoples of Asia Minor become Islamized?
Two principal axes
If we attempted to summarize in two central points the “why” behind the
initial religious shift of the Asia Minor populations, we could say:
1. The progressive severance of the periphery from the center.
2. The spiritual ascendancy of Islam in that time and region.
2.1. The severance of the periphery from Constantinople
As the centuries passed, Constantinople, the Queen of Cities grew
increasingly detached from her eastern provinces. Unfit leaders,
internal strife, economic hardship, military incapacity, and later the
disastrous rupture of the Latin conquest severed the bonds of center and
periphery.
Administrative, economic, military, and spiritual alienation bred
resentment. The populations of the eastern themes lived under relentless
pressure from Muslim forces, in a climate of insecurity and
instability, unable any longer to look to the center for protection.
The authoritarianism of the center—high taxation, suppression of
uprisings, population displacements, harsh administrative
interventions—deepened the rift.
Thus the periphery gradually found itself before an existential dilemma:
• either to self-organize and detach,
• or to attach itself to another, stronger center capable of providing
security, order, and continuity—even at the cost of changing religion
and identity.
This pattern is not merely a historical episode; it is a law of history:
when the periphery is abandoned, when its people feel that “their
center” no longer protects or inspires them, they inevitably seek
another center—another point of reference.
2.2. The spiritual ascendancy of Islam
At the same time, the people of Asia Minor lived in a space where Islam
was steadily gaining spiritual hegemony. By the 7th–8th century the
eastern provinces were already in contact with the Muslim world. Their
population—mostly agrarian, devout in a popular sense yet theologically
untrained—carried with it many older religious notions (sun worship,
Great Mother cults, mystery traditions, etc.).
Within this soil sprang forth innumerable heresies and heterodoxies:
Arians, Montanists, Nestorians, Isaurian iconoclasts, Paulicians,
Manichaeans, Euchites, and many more. Many of these movements clashed
violently with the center, resulting in exile, slaughter, and the
depopulation of regions.
In this environment, Islam did not appear as something entirely foreign.
To many, it was perceived as simply “another Eastern religious
proposal,” often with similar doctrinal axes:
– opposition to icons,
– strict monotheism and sharp rejection of the Incarnation,
– dualistic notions of good and evil,
– rejection of the sacraments of the Church.
Thus for those already distanced from Orthodoxy, moving from one
heterodoxy to another—this time named “Islam”—did not seem a great or
sudden leap.
3. The Sufi orders: bridges between Christianity and Islam
The spread of Islam in Asia Minor was decisively advanced by the Sufi
orders and brotherhoods. Rooted in the ancient Asia Minor tradition of
confraternities, they offered Islam both spiritual hegemony and social
function.
They taught a peculiar, mystical Islam imbued with many Christian
memories, references, and practices. In effect they became an
intermediate step between Christianity and Islam, a bridge that enabled
multitudes to cross from one framework to the other without feeling they
were wholly betraying their past.
The figures were many: the ascetic Sheikh Sarı Saltık; the renowned
Jalal al-Din Rumi, called Mevlana (“the Master”), founder of the Mevlevi
dervishes; Sheikh Bedreddin Mahmud; Baba Ishak, founder of the Baba’i
order; Hacı Bektash, founder of the powerful Bektashi order whose
popular expression today is the tens of millions of Alevis; the
Kizilbash movement; the Rufai (or Hurufi) order; Molla Kabiz; Mustafa
Börklüce; the Ahi brotherhoods; and many others.
Behind these names lies a simple truth:
Islam prevailed not only through force, but also through a convincing
spiritual vision, social ideals, and the promise of justice for the
common people.
And so the religious landscape of Asia Minor changed rapidly. Especially
after the fall of Romanía to the Franks, the retreat of the Orthodox
Church, and the abandonment of many monasteries, the people were left
uncatechized, unprotected, and theologically vulnerable. Into this
vacuum the orders stepped, offering meaning, identity, and
community—even if that meant gradual Islamization.
4. Islamization and Turkification: the social engineering of an empire
Once the core of the Ottoman state was consolidated, its mechanisms of
power accelerated the process. Gradual penetration was no longer
sufficient; a systematic transformation of populations was required.
The means were multiple and layered:
– the devshirme and the creation of the Janissary corps,
– forced abductions of women and mixed marriages under polygamy,
ensuring the full assimilation of Christian wives and their children,
– high taxation of the “infidels,” which drove many families—often wealthy ones—to conversion,
– social, administrative, legal, and economic discrimination against non-Muslims,
– systematic false accusations of apostasy against Christians, compelling them to convert under threat of death,
– Islamization of slaves,
– targeted, violent mass Islamizations in strategically vital regions.
The Islamized person received a new Muslim name and disappeared from his
Genos. Memory itself was severed. The same occurred among the so-called
“Turkocretans,” and in Cyprus and the Balkans, in countless communities
now hidden behind labels such as “Turkish,” “Muslim,” “Albanian,” etc.
5. The theological heart of the matter: identity, light, and freedom
This history is not merely geopolitics; it is above all a theological and existential drama.
The trajectory of Islamization demonstrates once again that the
religious identity of a people determines to a great extent its
historical endurance and its ability to exist as an “other.”
For the Genos of the Romeoi this is especially true. We are not speaking
of an abstract “religious ideology,” but of a people who once saw and
touched the risen Christ, who tasted Him in the mysteries, in the Divine
Liturgy, in the hesychast life.
Yet when illumination is lost—when the living relationship with Christ
gives way to formalism, compromise, and secularization—the nous is
darkened. And inevitably comes the submission to every passing ideology:
sometimes Islam, sometimes nationalism, sometimes materialist
globalization.
Whenever the Orthodox Church falters, retreats, or becomes a mere
“religious service provider,” the Genos shrinks—not because “the numbers
decline,” but because the way is lost, the Romeosyne as a concrete mode
of existence in Christ.
Christ can, if He wills, “raise up children to Abraham even from
stones.” But He respects our freedom. If we, as Church and as baptized
Orthodox, allow things to collapse, He will not coerce us. The
responsibility lies in our hands—now more than ever, for we already bear
two millennia of experience and are no longer in the ‘childhood’ of the
Church.
6. Contemporary Turkey: from Kemalism to Sunni Islam
The historical background of the Islamizations helps us understand
present-day Turkey. Modern Turkey is undergoing a prolonged transition:
from Kemalist nationalism and the role of the “secular gendarme” of the
region toward the ascendancy of Sunni Islam and the role of a regional
superpower with neo-Ottoman ambitions.
This shift toward more overtly Islamic social models is again being
driven largely by Sufi and “brotherhood” networks, which have flourished
since the 1980s. Even though the powerful Nurcu movement —led by the
late Fethullah Gulen— receded after the 2016 coup attempt, it was soon
replaced by other even more conservative Islamic orders, brotherhoods,
and NGOs such as the Naqshbandis, Menzil, the Suleymanlis
(Süleymancılar), and others.
For decades the strategy of the West—seeking to empower Sunni Islam as a
“manageable partner” and a counterweight to other currents—greatly
aided this transition. Thus, with the tolerance and often the blessing
of global powers, Turkey has sought to reassert itself as leader of the
Sunni world, with its gaze fixed on the lands of the former Ottoman
Empire.
This vision manifests itself both rhetorically and practically in our own homeland, through:
– systematic efforts to Turkify the Pomaks and other Muslims of Western Thrace,
– the Turkic-Islamic radicalization of peaceful communities on the islands,
– economic penetration and the creation of enclaves in northern and other regions of Greece,
– cultural and spiritual infiltration by every means.
Here sober but decisive vigilance is needed. We can no longer afford to
interpret events through the lens of simplistic “anti-Turkism.” We must
view reality with clarity, aware of the millennial history of the
Islamized Romeoi who today form the backbone of that state.
7. Turkey’s identity crisis: a wound reopening
Despite decades of intensive indoctrination by the Turkish state, the
lost identities have not vanished. They resist—if only subconsciously.
In recent years, due to the internet, satellite media, tourism, new
scientific findings, and a partial relaxation of censorship, many
intellectuals—journalists, writers, academics etc—have begun publicly
asking questions about the true origins of large segments of the
population.
Symbolic eruptions of collective memory also appear: mass demonstrations
with slogans like “We are all Armenians,” or gestures of solidarity
toward Kurds, Romeoi, and Armenians—all revealing that beneath the
surface of uniformity lies a deep identity crisis.
At this point, we Romeoi possess the historical truth—not as a weapon of
guilt but as a philanthropic mirror. We can offer evidence and answers
to those who seek them; answers that will help them rediscover their
identity and redefine their path.
Therefore, as individuals and as small communities—friendships, parish
groups, cultural associations—we must help those who now search, and
they are many on the opposite shore of the Aegean, to discover their
roots and their lost point of departure.
There are many avenues: communication, friendships, travel, websites,
books, conferences, cultural exchanges, collaborations. Small gestures,
yet ones that touch the existential questions of persons and peoples.
Here it must be emphasized that our political movement, NIKI, fully
aware of its mission and responsibilities in the rebirth and historical
journey of our Genos, regards this identity question of the Asia Minor
populations as fundamental—a pillar of its Foreign Policy. It assumes a
leading role, using every available means and in both languages, Greek
and Turkish—through online presence, books, articles, audiovisual
material, conferences, and cultural initiatives—both in documenting the
historical truth and in transmitting it to all who seek it, especially
to the Asia Minor populations themselves.
The search for their true identity—their kimlik meselesi—is one of the
major issues of today’s Asia Minor peoples, and it will influence,
increasingly, the future events of the wider region.
8. What does all this mean for us today?
We live in difficult times, in a new “dense night” of history. The storm
of the so-called “new age,” the visions of a colorless globalization,
the continual dismantling of every traditional identity—none of this
leaves anyone unaffected.
Within this global landscape, we Orthodox Romeoi are called to
resist—not merely for “national reasons,” but primarily for reasons of
salvation:
– the salvation of our own identity, our Romeosyne,
– the salvation of every human being thirsting for truth, freedom, and meaning.
If we do not resist by maintaining a high Orthodox phronema, phenomena like Islamization will erase us historically.
And “resistance,” in the logic of Romeosyne, means a return to the sources:
– immersion anew in our hesychast, agiopateric tradition,
– re-evangelization of all—clergy and laity,
– the rebirth of the parish as a living community, not a “repository of sacraments,”
– Liturgical life—and again Liturgical life,
– prayer, repentance, neptic vigilance,
– an affirmation of the world without conformity to the spirit of the world.
Only thus will there be Holy-Spirit solutions at both personal and collective levels.
Only thus will we not vanish in the next turn of history, as nearly
disappeared the Romeike deposit in the West, in Palestine, in Asia
Minor.
9. Epilogue
The Islamization and Turkification of a large part of our Genos is an
open chapter of history. It does not belong to the past; it casts its
shadow over our present and our future.
Without defeatism yet without illusions, we must:
– study it thoroughly,
– acknowledge our responsibilities as Church and people,
– draw from this experience guidance so as not to repeat the same mistakes,
– stand with discernment before modern Turkey, seeing behind the mask of
the state the faces, the wounded identities, the Islamized Romeoi and
their children and grandchildren.
Above all, we must move forward with the certainty that final victory
belongs neither to empires nor ideologies, but to our Risen Lord and His
Church, concerning which the word has already been spoken: “and the
gates of Hades shall not prevail against it.”
This certainty is no pretext for inaction; it is the hidden root of a
proud and sober struggle for the salvation of our Genos and of all who
desire salvation—even if they descend from distant or more recent
generations of Islamized Romeoi.
Notes: (a) The term “Romanía” (with an accent on the í to distinguish
it from the modern state of Romania) is the correct designation for the
Roman Empire after the transfer of its capital, instead of the
erroneous and deliberately employed term “Byzantium”.
(b) For reasons of more accurate phonological rendering and simplification, the term “Romeoi” was preferred over “Rhomaioi”.
(c) The term “Romeosyne” was preferred over “Romanitas”, as it better
expresses the culture of the Roman Empire after the prevalence of
Christianity.
(d) romeike (adjective): of the Romeoi.
See also: Romeosyne (tag)
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